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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article was originally intended to be an analysis of the 
propriety, or impropriety, of the doctrines most commonly used by courts 
to decide employees’ whistleblowing retaliation claims against 
employers.  However, upon conducting initial research, it quickly 
became apparent that there was very little data available on 
whistleblowing cases.  Unlike employment discrimination cases, where 
several empirical studies have been conducted, there is only one 
empirical analysis of whistleblower claims, which focused solely on 
outcomes in the federal administrative process for claims brought under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).
1
  That study revealed that 
whistleblowers fare poorly for a number of reasons, but many of the 
reasons suggested by the author appear to be unique to SOX plaintiffs.
2
  
This Article studies the success rates of whistleblowers suing under state 
law, as different a context as possible from SOX, and identifies common 
reasons whistleblower claims fail in these cases. 
II.  PERSPECTIVES ON WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Legal protections for whistleblowers are a fairly recent 
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 1. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly, 
Unfulfilled Expectations].  Professor Moberly revisited this study in 2012 and concluded that win 
rates were still quite low.  Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten 
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Moberly, Ten Years Later]. 
 2. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 100–20 (arguing that “procedural 
hurdles” unique to Sarbanes-Oxley and the limited scope of protection under the act contribute to 
low whistleblower success rates). 
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phenomenon.
3
  They have developed over the last century, resulting in a 
multitude of sources of legal protection for whistleblowers.
4
  More 
recently, and on a nearly annual basis, Congress has enacted additional 
protections for whistleblowers.
5
  Research suggests that whistleblowers 
play an important role in uncovering fraud, with indications that 
whistleblowers in fact provide some of the most valuable information 
about corporate fraud.
6
  The current trend of legislative action has been 
quite supportive of whistleblowers.  This support, however, does not 
mean that whistleblowers are able to report corporate wrongdoing with 
impunity. 
A. Employer and Regulator Responses to Whistleblowing 
Even though there is legislative support for greater whistleblower 
protections, it does not appear that employers share that sentiment.
7
  
While there has been some conflicting evidence regarding the extent of 
retaliation against whistleblowers under SOX,
8
 a recent study of 
whistleblowing in corporations suggests that employees who blow the 
whistle do not fare well professionally.
9
  This study considered situations 
where corporate fraud was alleged involving U.S. companies between 
1996 and 2004.
10
  Part of the analysis concerned the professional effects 
of blowing the whistle for individuals who disclosed potential corporate 
                                                          
 3. See generally DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW 
OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 1–12 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the development of legal protections 
for whistleblowers in the United States). 
 4. See id. apps. A–F (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) (listing hundreds of sources of legal 
protections for whistleblowers). 
 5. See id. at 4-10 to 4-15 (Supp. 2012) (describing new protections such as the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the National Transit Systems Security Act, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act). 
 6. See Richard P. Nielsen, Whistle-Blowing Methods for Navigating Within and Helping 
Reform Regulatory Institutions, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 385 (2013) (“There is a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that whistle-blowing is one of the most important sources of information for 
detecting and reducing illegal and unethical corporate behaviors.”) (citing STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE 
WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND 
PROTECTING YOURSELF (2011)). 
 7. See, e.g., Eugenie Samuel Reich, Whistle-blower Claims His Accusations Cost Him His Job, 
474 NATURE 140, 140 (2011) (describing how one researcher was given the choice of voluntarily 
resigning or being fired after he raised concerns about the accuracy of his supervisor’s research). 
 8. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1, at 27–28 (describing varying empirical 
evidence regarding retaliation against SOX whistleblowers).  
 9. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2240–45 (2010).  
 10. Id. at 2213. 
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fraud.
11
  Outsiders fared significantly better than employees.
12
  
Journalists, for instance, were more likely to find better jobs after they 
reported corporate fraud.
13
  In contrast, 82% of employee whistleblowers 
reported retaliation in the form of being fired, quitting under duress, or 
suffering significantly altered employment responsibilities.
14
  Many said, 
“If I had to do it over again, I wouldn’t.”
15
 Employees were often forced 
to change the industry in which they worked and the location in which 
they lived in order to avoid harassment.
16
 
Numerous other researchers have found similar incidents of 
professional retaliation, ranging from receiving poor performance 
evaluations all the way up to being blacklisted in an entire industry.
17
  
Other studies have found much lower rates of retaliation.  For example, 
the Ethics Resource Center’s 2011 study of whistleblowers found that 
22% of employees who reported misconduct suffered retaliation.
18
  
While these two studies report widely disparate rates of retaliation, even 
if the reality is closer to the lower 22% rate, it means that nearly a quarter 
of those who report their employer’s wrongdoing suffer retaliation. 
The prevalence of retaliation in these studies resonates with 
anecdotal evidence regarding the effects of whistleblowing on 
employees.  C. Fred Alford’s book, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and 
Organizational Power, details some of the consequences that arise in 
whistleblowers’ personal lives.
19
  The book begins with a 
whistleblower’s description of how his life changed after reporting 
misconduct: “I didn’t just lose my job.  I lost my house, and then I lost 
my family.”
20
  Similarly, when Roger Boisjoly exposed flaws in the 
decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger, not only did his career 
“end[] up in the toilet big time,” he also suffered adverse health 
                                                          
 11. Id. at 2240–45. 
 12. See id. at 2231–48 (concluding employees suffer significantly more than auditors, analysts, 
and journalists).  
 13. See id. at 2239–40. 
 14. Id. at 2240.   
 15. Id. at 2216. 
 16. Id. at 2240, 2245. 
 17. See, e.g., Carmen R. Apaza & Yongjin Chang, What Makes Whistleblowing Effective: 
Whistleblowing in Peru and South Korea, 13 PUB. INTEGRITY 113, 116 (2011).  
 18. 2011 National Business Ethics Survey: Workplace Ethics in Transition, ETHICS RES. CTR. 
1, 15 (2012), http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/FinalNBES-web.pdf. 
 19. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 
(2001). 
 20. Id. at 1. 
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consequences, including post-traumatic stress disorder.
21
  Additionally, 
whistleblowers can suffer financially both due to losing a job from 
retaliation and costs associated with personal problems such as divorce.
22
 
It is not only corporations that react strongly to whistleblowers.  
Even regulators can fail to react positively to whistleblowers due to 
political pressure.
23
  Historically, whistleblowers who exposed some of 
the more egregious conduct of the government have been targeted.
24
  For 
example, Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, 
was prosecuted by the federal government.
25
  Charges were only dropped 
when it was revealed that government agents had broken into his 
psychiatrist’s office in an attempt to uncover damaging information 
about him.
26
  Coleen Rowley, who revealed failures within the FBI at 
uncovering the 9/11 plot, was demoted and pushed out of the agency.
27
  
Recently, the Obama Administration has responded to whistleblowing 
with federal criminal charges of disclosing confidential information.
28
  
The Administration even fired a CIA whistleblower’s spouse, who also 
worked for the Agency, after the whistleblower made disclosures to the 
public about missteps in the War on Terror.
29
  The most recent 
whistleblower to be targeted by the Administration is Edward J. 
Snowden, who is the seventh individual indicted for leaking classified 
information under this Administration.
30
 But perhaps most tellingly, an 
entire book has been written on how to “survive” being a whistleblower 
with one full chapter devoted to describing the dangers whistleblowers 
                                                          
 21. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 36 (2003). 
 22. See Nielsen, supra note 6, at 389 (discussing that whistleblowing is frequently associated 
with adverse career consequences leading to financial difficulty, marital strain, and ultimately 
divorce). 
 23. See id. at 386–89 (noting that political actors under pressure can influence appointed 
regulators to overlook whistleblowing cases). 
 24. See Lance DeHaven-Smith, Myth and Reality of Whistleblower Protections: Official 
Behavior at the Top, 13 PUB. INTEGRITY 207, 212–15 (2011). 
 25. Id. at 212. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See Peter Van Buren, State of the Campaign Against Whistleblowers, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 
2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-215_162-57374034/state-of-the-campaign-against-
whistleblowers/ (discussing the increased amount of charges brought under the Espionage Act by the 
Obama administration).  
 29. Id. 
 30. See Scott Shane, Ex Contractor is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/us/snowden-espionage-
act.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
  




Why do so many employers and those with oversight authority react 
negatively to whistleblowers?  One leading plaintiffs’ attorney in this 
area of the law believes that employers’ negative responses are due to 
simple human nature.  As Stephen Kohn states, “No one likes to be told 
that she may have violated a law.”
32
  In addition, there is evidence that 
companies’ corporate culture instills fear of reporting improper or illegal 
behavior.
33
  As noted above, a potential explanation for lack of 
regulatory support for whistleblowers is that agencies bow to political 
pressure.
34
  Another explanation is simply the lack of resources for the 
investigation of whistleblower allegations.
35
 
While these problems may prevent some whistleblowers from 
receiving a positive reaction within their company or from a regulatory 
agency, in theory, a court’s adjudication of whistleblower claims should 
not be affected by these problems.  Not being a part of the corporate 
entity engaged in wrongdoing, a judge should be able to neutrally assess 
the validity of a whistleblower’s complaint.  In addition, because of the 
at least semi-independent nature of the judiciary, judges should be free 
from the political pressures that affect agencies.  While courts have 
struggled with increasing dockets
36
 and the concomitant limitation on 
resources, they are not free to simply ignore the whistleblower cases that 
arise.  Thus, it would seem that the court system would be, at worst, 
neutral for whistleblowers. 
                                                          
 31. TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL 
GUIDE 19–40 (2011) (explaining common methods of “Targeting Dissenters” and “Neutralizing 
Dissent”). 
 32. STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO 
DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND PROTECTING YOURSELF 19 (2011). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Nielsen, supra note 6, at 388–89.  An example of the effect politics has on agency 
response is evident in the recent shift in the legal standards the Department of Labor applies to 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims.  The current Administrative Review Board has overruled 
Bush-era decisions in these cases.  See, e.g., Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines Inc., ARB No. 10-029, 
2012 WL 1143309 (Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012) (establishing new standards 
applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims); Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07-
123, 2011 WL 2165854 (Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. May 25, 2011). 
 35. See Nielson, supra note 6, at 386–87 (discussing lack of resources within regulatory 
agencies devoted to investigating whistleblowing allegations). 
 36. See, e.g., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2011 tbl.6.1, UNITED STATES COURTS (2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-
2011.aspx (showing 266,783 civil and criminal cases filed in U.S. District Courts in 1990 compared 
to 367,692 civil and criminal cases filed in 2011).  
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B. Understanding Whistleblower Cases 
Whistleblower cases present themselves in a myriad of forms.  Cases 
differ because not only are there federal and state statutes that afford 
protection to whistleblowers, but there are also common law protections 
available.
37
  Most of the federal statutes are topic specific: that is, they 
protect only whistleblowers who disclose an employer’s misconduct 
regarding a particular issue.
38
  SOX, for example, protects employees 
who disclose securities fraud as well as related wrongdoing.
39
  There are 
federal statutes protecting employees who disclose violations of federal 
law relating to transportation, banking, nuclear power plants, health care, 
and a host of other areas.
40
  These statutes are primarily designed to 
protect employees in the private sector.
41
  The bulk of these federal 
statutes require administrative exhaustion before the whistleblower can 
bring suit in federal court.
42
 
Looking beyond federal protection, employees may also be protected 
by state statutes.  Some of these mirror federal statutes and are topic 
specific.
43
  Others, however, are broadly worded and protect 
whistleblowers who disclose a wide variety of wrongdoing.  For 
example, Minnesota has a whistleblower protection statute that protects 
employees who report illegal activity, refuse to engage in illegal activity, 
or testify regarding illegal activity.
44
  Despite the apparent breadth of 
statutes such as Minnesota’s, the majority of state statutes only protect 
government employees, not employees in the private sector.
45
 
In addition to these statutory protections, nearly every state also 
                                                          
 37. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, at 56–153 (describing various types of 
protections available to whistleblowers in the public sector, private sector, and under common law). 
 38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012) (providing protection for reporting violations of the 
Atomic Energy Act).  An exception is the Whistleblower Protection Act, which applies to all federal 
employees.  5 U.S.C. §§ 1211–1219, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2012). 
 39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).  
 40. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, app. C (listing various federal statutes that 
protect whistleblowers). 
 41. See id.  
 42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (requiring a whistleblower to first file a complaint with 
the Secretary of Labor to issue a final decision within 180 days prior to bringing an action in the 
appropriate district court); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, app. C (listing 
administrative requirements included in federal whistleblowing statutes).  
 43. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:967–968 (2012) (protecting employees from 
retaliation for reporting violations of law). 
 44. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2013). 
 45. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, apps. A, B (2004 ed. & Supp. 2012) (listing state 
whistleblower protection statutes, most of which concern exclusively public sector employees). 
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recognizes a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
46
  
This common law tort claim provides recourse to employees who are 
fired for a reason that violates public policy.
47
  The applicability of this 
claim overlaps in some respects with state statutory whistleblower 
protections.  Typically, the common law claim includes protection for 
employees who refuse to engage in unlawful activities as well as for 
employees who report their employer’s unlawful conduct.
48
 
C. Court Responses to Whistleblowing Plaintiffs 
There is little data available on the outcomes of whistleblower claims 
in federal or state courts.  What is known about whistleblower claims is 
nearly entirely anecdotal, but there are a few exceptions.  First, Richard 
Moberly conducted a study in 2007,
49
 which he updated in 2012,
50
 on the 
outcomes of whistleblower claims brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  SOX whistleblowing claims must be brought first before the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), not in court.
51
  
Professor Moberly initially assessed claims brought over a three-year 
period and found that employees’ claims succeeded a mere 3.6% of the 
time before the initial administrative investigation within the OSHA and 
succeeded only 6.5% of the time before an administrative law judge.
52
  
These low rates of success for whistleblowers did not improve over time.  
In his 2012 update, Professor Moberley found that only 1.8% of 
employee claims were successful at the OSHA investigation stage during 
the first decade of SOX.
53
 
Based on his detailed analysis of the written decisions, Professor 
Moberly identified several reasons for the low rates of plaintiff success.  
One common reason employees lost was because they failed to file their 
                                                          
 46. See id. at ch. 5 (discussing the ways in which the common law protects whistleblowers).  
The wrongful discharge claim is not limited to whistleblowers; its coverage is broader and protects 
employees who assert rights such as the right to receive worker’s compensation.  Id. at 112–13.  
 47. Id. at 95.  
 48. See, e.g., Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Neb. 1988) 
(“Consequently, an action for wrongful discharge lies only when an at-will employee acts in good 
faith and upon reasonable cause in reporting his employer’s suspected violation of the criminal 
code.”). 
 49. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1. 
 50. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1.  
 51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2012) (“A person who alleges discharge or other discrimination 
[under this Act] . . . may seek relief . . . by—filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor . . . .”). 
 52. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 91. 
 53. Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1, at 29. 
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claims in a timely manner.
54
  Another reason for employees’ low win rate 
was based on statutory coverage: a significant number of employers were 
found not to be covered by the whistleblower protection provisions of 
SOX.
55
  Additionally, Moberly found that whistleblower claims were 
often unsuccessful because courts concluded that employees had not 
engaged in protected behavior as defined by the Act.
56
  Finally, Moberly 
found that employees were often unable to provide sufficient evidence to 




Moberly initially indicated that the sobering results of his research 
might be partially due to the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley was a new statute, 
and thus subsequent decisions, including those by district court judges, 
might broaden the coverage of the Act beyond what the OSHA and 
administrative judges initially provided.
58
  However, in his 2012 article, 
Moberly suggested that federal courts instead appear to be following the 
narrow interpretations found in the original administrative decisions.
59
  
While Moberly’s findings are not favorable for whistleblowers, the 
apparently dire prospects for SOX plaintiffs may be mitigated by recent 
changes in the composition of the Administrative Review Board 
(ARB),
60
 which reviews the decisions of the administrative law judges 
within the OSHA.  Recent decisions by the ARB have reversed earlier 




While Moberly’s research is thorough and its results are disturbing, it 
is nearly impossible to generalize from his SOX research to other 
whistleblower cases for several reasons.  First, the cases Moberly studied 
                                                          
 54. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 107. 
 55. Id. at 109–10.  
 56. Id. at 113–14. 
 57. Id. at 120–24. 
 58. See id. at 72 (stating that the strict legal scrutiny applied to employees’ claims may be a 
result of the “push and pull of defining a new statute’s legal boundaries”).  Moberly’s research 
suggests that the administrative decisions were becoming more, not less, employer-favorable over 
time.  See Moberly, Unfullfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 91.  
 59. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the evidence of federal court 
rulings that have deferred to the administrative judges’ narrow reading of the Act). 
 60. See id. at 42 (noting that the Obama Administration appointed five new members to the 
ARB’s five-member panel in 2010 and 2011). 
 61. See, e.g., Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., ARB No. 10-111, 10-115, 2012 WL 
1999677, at *12 (Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. May 31, 2012); Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines 
Inc., ARB No. 10-029, 2012 WL 1143309, at *4–5 (Dept. of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012); 
Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *19 (Dept. of Labor Admin. 
Rev. Bd. May 25, 2011). 
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were decided within a federal agency, the Department of Labor.  It is far 
from certain that state administrative tribunals would come to similar 
decisions, much less that state courts would reach similar outcomes.  
Second, the cases were decided under one specifically-focused federal 
statute—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  As Moberly discovered, the OSHA 
and administrative judges were interpreting this statute, with its focus on 
exposing fraud within publicly held corporations, very narrowly.
62
  Such 
narrow interpretations would seem to be less likely where the statute was 
more generally worded to protect whistleblowers in a wide variety of 
situations.  Thus, extrapolating Moberly’s results to state whistleblower 
suits under either a common law theory of wrongful discharge or a 
generalized statute protecting whistleblowers is questionable. 
The other empirical study that tangentially involved whistleblowers 
was conducted by David Benjamin Oppenheimer, who studied jury 
verdicts in employment claims brought in California.
63
  The study 
compared verdicts in employment discrimination cases with those in 
wrongful discharge cases.
64
  Oppenheimer concluded that plaintiffs won 
wrongful discharge claims more frequently than employment 
discrimination claims, although the difference was not statistically 
significant.
65
  There were a few interesting details that directly address 
whistleblowers in this study.  First, claims brought by whistleblowers 
were more likely to result in a plaintiff’s verdict than general wrongful 
discharge claims.  Whistleblowers obtained a favorable verdict 63% of 
the time, as compared to 59% for all wrongful discharge claims and 50% 
for employment discrimination claims.
66
  Second, it appears that sex and 
race may have had significant impact on the outcome of some 
employment claims.  According to the study, females who alleged sexual 
discrimination and non-whites who alleged racial discrimination fared 
worse than other types of employment claims in front of a jury.
67
  
Because Professor Oppenheimer studied jury verdicts, his research did 
not include information on how whistleblowers fared before reaching the 
                                                          
 62. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 90. 
 63. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California 
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for 
Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511 (2003).   
 64. Id. at 532–35. 
 65. Id. at 535 (reporting a verdict success rate for plaintiffs of 50% in statutory employment 
discrimination cases and 59% in common law wrongful discharge claims).  
 66. Id. at 536, 538–39.  Again, this difference is not statistically significant.  Id. at 538. 
 67. Id. at 552. 
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jury.
68
  Thus, it does not furnish information on the rates at which 
whistleblower claims succeed. 
These studies provide limited insight into how whistleblowers fare in 
the legal system; Mobley’s, because it is focused on a very narrow 
statutory right and on federal administrative decision-makers, and 
Oppenheimer’s because the data on whistleblowers was limited to jury 
verdicts. 
D. Court Responses to Plaintiffs Bringing Other Claims 
Because of the paucity of empirical studies on whistleblowers, it is 
helpful to consider how plaintiffs fare in cases outside the 
whistleblowing context.  There are analyses of how employees outside of 
the whistleblower context fare in litigation that provide data usable for 
comparative purposes to explore whether whistleblowers succeed more 
or less often than other employees.
69
  Probably the most similar context 
that has been studied involves outcomes in employment discrimination 
cases.  These cases present a comparator group of plaintiffs suing their 
former employers, a similar setting to whistleblower litigation.  The 
central finding of these studies is that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs do not fare particularly well.
70
  In their seminal articles on the 
topic, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab determined that plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases fared worse at both the trial level and 
on appeal than other federal plaintiffs.
71
 
While their initial work was a number of years ago, Clermont and 
Schwab recently updated their research on employment discrimination 
success rates for plaintiffs in federal court and found the same patterns 
persisting and, in some instances, becoming even worse.
72
  On appeal, 
decisions and verdicts in favor of plaintiffs were reversed far more 
frequently than those in favor of defendants.
73
  Pretrial decisions in favor 
of plaintiffs were reversed 30% of the time on appeal, while pretrial 
                                                          
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs]. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 455–56.  
 72. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & 
Schwab, From Bad to Worse].   
 73. Id. at 110. 
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decisions in favor of defendants were reversed in only 11% of cases.
74
  
When the plaintiff prevailed at trial, decisions were reversed on appeal 
41% of the time, while defendants who prevailed at trial were only 
reversed 9% of the time.
75
  The authors found these results particularly 
disturbing because of the nature of employment discrimination claims, 
where the outcome is fact-specific and focuses on the intent of the 
defendant.
76
  Clermont and Schwab concluded that there was an anti-
plaintiff effect in play.
77
  This effect was also seen at the district court 
level, where employment discrimination plaintiffs prevailed in only 15% 
of cases as contrasted with a win rate of 51% for plaintiffs in other types 
of cases.
78
  Similarly, plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases won 
at trial 28% of the time, which is far less often than plaintiffs in other 
federal cases, who enjoyed a win rate of approximately 45%.
79
  In 
general, plaintiffs in tort cases brought in state courts prevail at trial 
approximately 50% of the time.
80
 
Based on the limited available research on whistleblowing and the 
competing possibilities of outcomes akin to employment discrimination 
litigation versus tort litigation, it seemed necessary to obtain additional 
information on how whistleblowing plaintiffs fare in the legal system.  
Do whistleblower plaintiffs have win rates similar to tort plaintiffs in 
state courts, employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal courts, or 
closer to what Moberly found in Sarbanes-Oxley administrative 
tribunals? 
III. RESEARCHING WHISTLEBLOWER CASES 
This research is limited in scope.  It is an initial look at a set of cases 
from the first quarter of 2012 that are available on a commercial 
database.  This research is based on opinions taken from a commercial 
database rather than data directly from state court systems for several 
reasons.  First, obtaining the data directly from court filings appeared to 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 112. 
 77. Id. at 104–05.  
 78. Id. at 127.  These figures are for cases not resulting in a settlement.   
 79. Id. at 129.   
 80. See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT 
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 12–13 (2009), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2132 (noting that the win rate at trial for plaintiffs 
remained stabled between 1996 and 2005). 
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be nearly impossible.
81
  State courts do not have a uniform system of 
coding the type of civil case filed, which presents difficulties in ensuring 
accurate comparisons between cases brought in different states.
82
  In 
addition, whistleblower cases do not appear to be a category that is even 
listed on some state cover sheets.
83
  Thus, obtaining data directly from 
state courts’ systems on whistleblowers would require a researcher to 
locate whistleblowing complaints in some states by reviewing all tort 
filings—a prohibitively expensive and time-consuming process. 
While it is my sense from having read hundreds of whistleblowing 
cases in my career that the results of this research are generally 
representative, it is not possible to determine whether the sample used in 
this research is in fact representative of all state whistleblower cases. 
A. Research Methodology 
The cases in this study were obtained by conducting specific, date-
limited, terms-and-connectors searches in a commercial database.  
Results were reviewed, coded according to the type of retaliatory 
conduct claim, and sorted into one of the following groups: (1) no 
employment retaliation claim at all;
84
 (2) a retaliation claim brought 
pursuant to a non-whistleblower statute (such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); or (3) a whistleblower claim brought pursuant to a 
whistleblower protection statute or a whistleblower-retaliation claim 
brought under the common law doctrine of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.  Decisions from the third category were then 
analyzed; decisions from the first two categories were not.
85
 
                                                          
 81. For example, Virginia does not have any category on its civil case cover sheet that identifies 
an employment claim or a wrongful discharge claim.  See COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, COVER 
SHEET FOR FILING CIVIL ACTIONS, www.courts.state.va.us/forms/circuit/cc1416.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2013) [hereinafter VIRGINIA CIVIL COVER SHEET].  California, in contrast, identifies 
Employment as a broad category and wrongful termination as a subcategory.  See CALIFORNIA 
COURTS, CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET, www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cm010.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 
2013).  
 82. This may be why many studies of outcomes in litigation use federal court cases—the 
consistency of the federal cover sheet ensures consistent data across the country.  
 83. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CIVIL COVER SHEET, supra note 81.  
 84. Because the searches were word searches that required certain terms to be present in the 
cases, it resulted in obtaining cases that used the terms but failed to involve an actual retaliation 
claim made by an employee.  
 85. Decisions from the first category were irrelevant—these decisions happened to mention 
terms in the search criteria but did not involve retaliation by an employer against an employee who 
complained of wrongdoing.  Decisions from the second category are relevant, but the majority of 
them primarily involved employment discrimination claims with a retaliation claim appended.  My 
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This third group of cases was further narrowed to include only cases 
where the court addressed the substance of a whistleblowing claim.  A 
number of cases involved discovery rulings or other non-substantive 
issues such as whether an arbitration agreement should be enforced.  
These cases were not analyzed because this research seeks an initial 
sense of how courts react to the substance of whistleblowing claims.  
Courts may rule on discovery issues substantively differently in 
whistleblowing cases than in non-whistleblowing cases, but that is not 
the focus of this research.  For cases involving multiple claims, only 
cases where a whistleblowing claim was substantively addressed in the 
opinion were included in the data pool.
86
  Thus, it is possible that in such 
cases a lower court did address the substance of the whistleblowing 
claim, but these earlier decisions were not a part of the data pool and 
were not considered.  Similarly, some whistleblowing claims from the 
data may have subsequently been addressed on appeal; once again, these 
were not included. 
Once narrowed down to opinions in which the court addressed the 
substance of the whistleblower claim, the cases were then coded 
according to outcome.  The outcomes included the plaintiff’s win-loss 
ratio as well as the manner of resolution (i.e. motion to dismiss granted, 
summary judgment denied, or jury verdict upheld). 
B. Results 
There were a total of 34 cases in which the court opinion addressed 
the substance of the whistleblower allegations.
87
  The opinions were 
                                                          
concern with these cases is that state courts tend to incorporate Title VII retaliation doctrines, and 
including these cases would mask outcomes and doctrines used in whistleblowing cases outside of 
the Title VII context.   
 86. There were several cases that were wrongful discharge claims that did not involve 
whistleblowers.  These cases were not included in the final pool of cases.   
 87. Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transp, Inc., 388 S.W.3d 456 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012); Brown v. Cnty. of 
L.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Paras v. Delta Dental of Cal., A131055, 2012 WL 
629997 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2012); Luu v. Luu’s Bros. Corp., No. C065408, 2012 WL 406908 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2012); Brown v. State Personnel Bd., No. F059897, 2012 WL 274349 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012); Morales v. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc., No. A131130, 2012 WL 
243231 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012); Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No. C062562, 2012 WL 86406 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012); Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012); Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d 789 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Cubilla v. Town of 
Montville, No. KNLCV116010874S, 2012 WL 800909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2012); Carlson v. 
Sheriden Woods Health Care Ctr., No. HHDCV116025384S, 2012 WL 753756 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 14, 2012); Conn. Dep’t of Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CV116008678S, 
2012 WL 695512 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Kulmann v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No. 
NNHCV106010414, 2012 WL 234218 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural 
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heavily weighted toward appellate decisions, as one would expect when 
using a commercial database.  Out of the 34 cases, 28 were decisions 
issued by a court of appeals.  Only 2 of these 28 appellate decisions were 
issued by a state’s highest court.  The remaining 6 opinions were issued 
by a trial court. 
1. Rates of Success and Failure 
While the vast majority of the opinions in the study were appellate 
decisions, these decisions necessarily included the outcomes at the trial 
level, making it possible to broadly analyze whistleblower success 
rates.
88
  Employers prevailed on the pending legal issue at the trial level 
in 26 out of 34 opinions, for a success rate of 76%.
89
  Only the appellate 
decisions included the final disposition of the whistleblower cases at the 
trial level.  Out of the 28 appellate decisions, the employer prevailed at 
the trial court level in the vast majority of cases, as indicated in 26 out of 
                                                          
Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263 (Idaho 2012); Ulm v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 964 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2012); Dysert v. Review Bd. of Dept. of Workforce Dev., No. 93A02-1105-EX-392, 2012 WL 
10142 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2012); East v. Office of Inspector Gen., 87 So.3d 925 (La. Ct. App. 
2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594, 2012 WL 470062 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Stay v. 
Connections Emp’t Res., No. 301709, 2012 WL 407500 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Wielen v. 
City of Bay City, No. 298256, 2012 WL 407266 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Vanderlaan v. Mich. 
Med., P.C., No. 300660, 2012 WL 284580 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012); Prieskorn v. Univ. of 
Mich. Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012); King v. Chrysler 
Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012); Dooms v. First Home Sav. 
Bank, 376 S.W.3d 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Disc., 808 N.W.2d 86 
(Neb. Ct. App. 2012); Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222 (Nev. 
March 20, 2012); Medina v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., No. 101823/2011, 2012 WL 987601 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 15, 2012); Connolly v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05, 2012 WL 205961 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 2012); Pierce v. Atl. Grp., Inc., 724 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); 
Williams v. City of Burns, No. M2010-02428-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 504511 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 
15, 2012); Quinn-Glover v. Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. W2011-00100-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 120209 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012); Nairn v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App. 
2012); S. Tex. Coll. v. Roberson, No. 13-10-00561-CV, 2012 WL 506324 (Tex. App. Feb. 16, 
2012); Mullins v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 357 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App. 2012). 
 88. The limitations of using cases contained in a commercial database become evident here.  
Westlaw does not obtain all trial court decisions on motions to dismiss and on summary judgment; in 
fact, it seems likely that a relatively small proportion of them are reported.   
 89. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 459; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Luu, 2012 WL 406908, at *1; 
Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *1; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *3; 
Mize-Kurzman, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265–66; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 791; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1266; 
Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 636; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at 3; East, 87 So.3d at 925; Todd, 2012 WL 
470062, at *1; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *1; Vanderlaan, 2012 
WL 284580, at *1; Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *1; Teetor, 808 
N.W.2d at 89; Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *1; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 571; Williams, 2012 WL 
504511, at *1; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *1; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 236; Roberson, 2012 
WL 506324, at *1; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 185. 
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the 28 opinions, for a success rate of 93%.  This percentage may be 
overstating employer success rates at the trial level.  Out of the 28 
appellate opinions, only 2 involved plaintiffs who prevailed at the trial 
level; both were jury trials.
90
  The only other way that a plaintiff prevails 
at the trial level in whistleblower cases is for the plaintiff to settle the 
case.  These cases are not captured by this study.  In 17 of the 34 cases 
(50%), the trial court found in favor of the employer on a motion for 
summary judgment (or equivalent) on the whistleblowing claim.
91
  Four 
out of the 34 cases (12%) went to a trial or administrative hearing—the 
functional equivalent to a trial—in which the employer prevailed.
92
  The 
employer prevailed on a motion to dismiss (or demurrer) at the trial level 




Employers also enjoyed significant success at the appellate level.  
The overall affirmation rate of trial court decisions in favor of the 
employer was 81% (21 out of 26 cases).
94
  The rates were similar 
regardless of the type of trial court decision.  Of the 17 summary 
judgment decisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the employer in 14 cases.
95
  Thus, on summary 
                                                          
 90. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381; Dooms, 376 S.W.3d at 669.  Additionally, another plaintiff 
prevailed at an administrative hearing, which was confirmed in a subsequent district court decision 
as included in whistleblower success rates below.  Saeedi, 2012 WL 695512, at *13.  
 91. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 459; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at 
*1; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *3; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 791; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1266; Ulm, 964 
N.E.2d at 636; Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at *1; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wielen, 2012 WL 
407266, at *1; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *1; Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King, 2012 
WL 164202, at *1; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 89; Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *1; Williams, 2012 
WL 504511, at *1; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 236.  
 92. Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *1; Mize-Kurzman, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265–66; Dysert, 2012 
WL 10142, at *3; East, 87 So.3d at 925. 
 93. Luu, 2012 WL 406908, at *1; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 571; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, 
at *1; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *1; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 185.  Both Roberson and Mullins 
involved special pleas of immunity instead of traditional motions to dismiss.  
 94. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 464; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at 
*6; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *6; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *9; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1274; 
Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 645; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at *5; East, 87 So.3d at 929; Stay, 2012 WL 
407500, at *5; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *5; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *4; Prieskorn, 
2012 WL 205801, at *4; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 95; Ainsworth, 2012 
WL 987222, at *4; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 579; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *7; Nairn, 366 
S.W.3d at 251; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *3; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 192. 
 95. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 464; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at 
*6; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *9; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1274; Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 645; Stay, 
2012 WL 407500, at *5; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *5; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *4; 
Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *4; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 95; 
Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *4; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 251.  
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judgment motions, trial courts were affirmed in favor of employers 82% 
of the time and reversed 18% of the time.  The rates were similar for 
cases decided on motions to dismiss.  Four out of the 5 cases in which 
the employer prevailed on a motion to dismiss were affirmed by the 
appellate court
96
 (although in 2 of these cases the appellate court upheld 
the dismissal of the whistleblower claim but remanded the cases to allow 
the plaintiff to amend the complaint
97
).  Appellate courts upheld 3 out of 
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On the other side, employees succeeded on the merits of their 
whistleblowing claims at the trial court level or administrative hearing 
                                                          
 96. Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 579; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *7; Roberson, 2012 WL 
506324, at *3; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 192. 
 97. Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *11; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *4.  
 98. Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *6; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at *5; East, 87 So.3d at 929.  
 99. It should be noted that the sample size for many of these categories is simply too small to 
produce statistically significant outcomes.  This chart indicates where a party prevailed on the merits 
of the whistleblowing claim.  The total percentages do not add up to 100 because of defendants’ 
losses on motions to dismiss and summary judgment.  For these two groups of cases, it is not known 
whether the defendant or plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the whistleblowing claim—only that the 
defendant did not win on that particular motion.   
 100. Obviously there were no cases where a plaintiff won the case on a motion to dismiss.  And 
in this data pool, there were no cases where a plaintiff sought summary judgment on the 
whistleblowing claim.  Thus, the only manner in which plaintiffs prevailed was at trial.   
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level in only 3 out of 34 cases, for an initial success rate of 9%.
101
  Out of 
the entire population of 34 cases, the employee prevailed on the pending 
legal matter (motion to dismiss, summary judgment, verdict, or 
administrative evidentiary finding) at the trial court level 8 times 
(24%).
102
  In 4 of the 34 cases (12%) the employers’ motions to 
dismiss
103
 were denied by the trial court.
104
  There was 1 denial of a 
motion for summary judgment included in the study.
105
  Thus, it is 
unknown whether the plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the 
whistleblowing claim in these 5 cases. 
It is to be expected that the only situation where the plaintiff 
prevailed on the merits of the whistleblower claim was after a trial or its 
equivalent.  As is typical for a plaintiff in most litigation, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof in these cases, making decisions in favor of the 
plaintiff at any preliminary stage of the case exceedingly unlikely.  
Furthermore, it bears mentioning that it is possible that the total win rate 
for plaintiffs is underrepresented in this study.  Plaintiffs prevail before 
trial by settling on favorable terms, and the database used in this study 
only included reported decisions; it did not include settlements. 
2. Comparative Analysis to Other Plaintiffs 
It appears whistleblowers fare less favorably than tort plaintiffs 
generally, as well as employment discrimination plaintiffs specifically.  
This research indicates that plaintiffs in whistleblower cases prevail at a 
rate of 9% at the trial or administrative hearing level.  This is slightly less 
than the 15% found by Clermont and Schwab for plaintiffs in 
                                                          
 101. Brown v. Cnty. of L.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Conn. Dep’t of 
Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CV116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Dooms v. First Home Sav. Bank,  376 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 102. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385; Cubilla v. Town of Montville, No. KNLCV116010874S, 
2012 WL 800909, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2012); Carlson v. Sheriden Woods Health Care 
Ctr., No. HDCV116025384S, 2012 WL 753756, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.  Feb. 14, 2012); Saeedi, 
2012 WL 695512, at *13; Kulmann v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No. NNHCV106010414, 2012 WL 
234218, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012); Dooms, 376 S.W.3d at 669; Medina v. Dep’t of Educ. 
of N.Y., No. 101823/2011, 2012 WL 987601, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2012); Connolly v. 
Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05, 2012 WL 205961, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 2012).  
 103. One of the four was styled a motion to strike, but the substance was essentially that of a 
motion to dismiss. Cubilla, 2012 WL 800909, at *5.  
 104. Id.; Carlson, 2012 WL 753756, at *1; Kulmann, 2012 WL 234218, at *5; Medina, 2012 WL 
987601, at *3.   
 105. Connolly, 2012 WL 205961, at *7.  
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employment discrimination cases.
106
  It also compares unfavorably to the 
overall win rate of plaintiffs in litigation in general, where plaintiffs in 
federal court prevail approximately 45% of the time,
107
 and plaintiffs in 
state court prevail about 50% of the time.
108
  The plaintiffs in this 
research at least prevailed slightly more often than the SOX 
whistleblowers in Moberly’s study, who prevailed at the administrative 
level only 3.6% of the time, but at a rate of 6.5% before an 
administrative law judge.
109
  Out of the 7 total cases in this research that 
went to trial or an administrative hearing, plaintiffs prevailed in 3, for a 
success rate of 43%.
110
  This compares unfavorably to Professor 
Oppenheimer’s study in which whistleblowing plaintiffs prevailed at trial 
in 63% of cases.
111
 
In terms of appellate review, appellate courts reversed decisions 
made in favor of the employer in 5 out of 26 appellate cases for a rate of 
19%.
112
  This is a slightly higher rate than Clermont and Schwab 
discovered for employers in discrimination cases, where defendant-
favorable outcomes at the trial and pretrial stage were reversed on appeal 
only 10% of the time.
113
  Because Moberly did not address appellate 
review, there is no comparable data from his SOX research.
114
 
C. Why Courts Deny Whistleblowers Relief 
As noted above, this research is not intended to be a perfectly 
representative sample of whistleblower cases.  Instead, it is an attempt to 
                                                          
 106. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 72, at 127. 
 107. Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 69, at 442. 
 108. COHEN, supra note 80, at 13. 
 109. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 67. 
 110. Brown v. Cnty. of L.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Conn. Dep’t of 
Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CV116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Dooms v. First Home Sav. Bank,  376 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 111. Oppenheimer, supra note 63, at 538. 
 112. Luu v. Luu’s Bros. Corp., No. C065408, 2012 WL 406908, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 
2012); Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); 
Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d 789, 796 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594, 
2012 WL 470062, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Williams v. City of Burns, No. M2010-02428-COA-
R3-CV, 2012 WL 504511, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2012). 
 113. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 72, at 110. The table on page 110 
shows that 1,133 out of 10,598 decisions in favor of employee at the pretrial stage were reversed on 
appeal and 178 out of 2,042 decisions favorable to employees were reversed on appeal. Id. 
Cumulatively, this means that 1,311 out of 12,640 trial court employer-favorable decisions were 
reversed on appeal coming to a percentage of around 10%. 
 114. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 86–87. 
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gain a first sense of both the success rates for whistleblower cases 
brought in state courts as well as the reasons for these rates of success.  
The reasons for success or failure provide some depth and context to the 
numerical analysis above. 
Nearly all decisions reviewed in this research followed the approach 
used in employment discrimination cases as to the quantum and type of 
evidence a plaintiff must produce to proceed to trial.
115
  The prima facie 
case, which is the predominant method of proving retaliation for 
engaging in whistleblowing, is typically articulated as follows.  The 
plaintiff must establish that: (1) she engaged in protected behavior, such 
as reporting unlawful activity; (2) she was discriminated against; and (3) 
there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
discrimination.
116
  Of these three requirements, the causal connection 
was the one that produced the most difficulty for whistleblowing 
plaintiffs, as discussed in detail below.
117
 
According to this research, even if the plaintiff produces sufficient 
evidence of causation to establish the prima facie case, causation must 
again be revisited, and once again it causes evidentiary problems for the 
plaintiff.  If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of 
proof shifts, just as in employment discrimination cases, to the defendant 
to articulate a legitimate reason for taking action against the plaintiff.
118
  
Once the employer has articulated its legitimate reason for taking the 
action, the plaintiff can still prevail if she can establish that the stated 
reason is a pretext.
119
  This implicates causation because the case then 
revolves around whether the employee was fired because of 
                                                          
 115. A few do not follow this approach.  See, e.g., Williams v. City of Burns, No. M2010-0248-
COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 504511, at *2 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2012) (noting that Tennessee has 
expressly rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework).  See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 116. See, e.g., Paras v. Delta Dental of Cal., No. A131055, 2012 WL 629997, at *6 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 27, 2012) (noting that California follows the McDonnell Douglas framework); Prieskorn 
v. Univ. of Mich. Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012) 
(following an equivalent Michigan standard). 
 117. This differs from Moberly’s research, where coverage was a significant problem.  Moberly, 
Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 109–13.  One would expect more plaintiff-favorable 
outcomes than in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims because employer-retaliation coverage was 
not  a significant issue in the whistleblowing cases in this research.  However, the win rates were 
fairly comparable at the trial level in my study (9%) and administrative law judge level (6.5%) in 
Moberly’s study.  Id. at 91.  This suggests that there is something else driving the outcomes in 
whistleblower cases and raises the possibility that regardless of rationale used by the court, 
whistleblowers win rates will remain low.   
 118. See, e.g., Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *6. 
 119. Id.  
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whistleblowing or for some other, non-protected reason.  The burden of 
proving causation, whether as a part of the prima facie case or by 
establishing pretext, was a significant problem for plaintiffs in the 
sample of cases. 
Out of the 34 total whistleblower cases, 15 involved analysis on the 
cause of the adverse action taken, making it the predominant legal basis 
for deciding whistleblowing cases in the sample.
120
  Some of these cases 
analyzed the causation issue as part of the prima facie case; others 
addressed causation on the issue of pretext.  Out of these 15 cases, the 
trial court found against the plaintiff on the issue of causation 13 times 
(87%).
121
  All of these 13 cases in which the trial court found that the 
causal connection could not be established were summary judgment 
decisions.  Thus, these were situations where the trial court determined 
as a matter of law, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not establish that the whistleblowing 
behavior was the cause of the adverse employment action. 
Inability to prove causation is the single largest reason that 
whistleblowers lost their case.
122
  This raises the question: Why do 
employees lose on causation?  Is it due to legal standards, poor job 
performance, or a lack of evidence linking their protected activity to the 
adverse employment action?  To answer this question, I decided to look 
beyond the numbers to assess the content of the court decisions in the 
study.  Specifically, I reviewed the text of the decisions as well as any 
                                                          
 120. Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *7; Morales v. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc., No. 
A131130, 2012 WL 243231, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012); Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No. 
C062562, 2012 WL 86406, at *4–8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012); Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d 
789, 795 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Conn. Dep’t of Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. 
CV116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Bollinger v. Fall River 
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1271–72 (Idaho 2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594, 
2012 WL 470062, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Stay v. Connections Emp’t Res., No. 301709, 
2012 WL 407500, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Wielen v. City of Bay City, No. 298256, 
2012 WL 407266, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Vanderlaan v. Mich. Med., P.C., No. 300660, 
2012 WL 284580, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012); Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *3–4; King 
v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012); 
Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Disc., 808 N.W.2d 86, 92–93 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012); Connolly v. 
Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05, 2012 WL 205961, at *5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 
2012); Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at *4–7. 
 121. Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *7; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *3; Swindle v. Res-Care 
Cal., Inc., No. C062562, 2012 WL 86406, at *3; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 792; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1268; 
Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at *2; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *1; 
Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *1; Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King,  2012 WL 164202, 
at *1; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 89; Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at *1. 
 122. This issue was similarly a problem that Moberly discovered in his analysis of plaintiffs in 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases.  See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 124–28. 
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available briefs filed by the parties on appeal.
123
 
The cases from the sample provide insight and help explain the 
infrequency of plaintiff success.  As discussed above, courts decided the 
bulk of summary judgment motions against the plaintiffs based on the 
court’s belief that causation cannot be established as a matter of law.  
Causation considers whether the employee was subject to adverse action 
because she engaged in protected activity or for another, legitimate 
reason.  In situations where employees produced sufficient evidence of 
pretext to withstand summary judgment, there appeared to be two factors 
at play: (1) the court’s articulation of the evidence necessary to establish 
pretext; and (2) the court’s willingness to ignore or dismiss out of hand 
the employee’s evidence that tends to disprove or cast doubt on the 




In the 13 cases where causation was decided against the plaintiff 
(either in the prima facie case or in the analysis of pretext) at the trial 
court level, 6 (46%) appear to involve trial courts making factual 
determinations that should reside with the jury.
125
  In 3 out of the 13 
cases (23%), the appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment.
126
  This reversal rate was actually slightly higher 
than the overall reversal rate for employers, which was 19%. 
1. Imposing a Causation Standard that is Unfavorable to Employees 
Courts improperly granting summary judgment on causation create 
an unfavorable standard employees struggle to overcome.  Vanderlaan v. 
Michigan Medical P.C. exemplifies both issues: legal standards on 
causation that limit the ability of plaintiffs to succeed as well as 
considering the facts in a light that is not favorable to the employee.
127
  
                                                          
 123. For the trial court decisions, briefs were not available. 
 124. This is in contravention of the legal standard for granting summary judgment, which 
requires considering the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the employee–
plaintiff).  See, e.g., Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *2 (“The trial court is not permitted to assess 
credibility, or to determine facts on a motion for summary disposition.” (citation omitted)). 
 125. Many of these cases will be discussed below.  Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No. C062562, 
2012 WL 86406 (Cal. App. Jan. 11, 2012); Wielen v. City of Bay City, No. 298256, 2012 WL 
407266 (Mich. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580; Prieskorn v. Univ. of Mich. 
Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. App. Jan. 24, 2012); King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 
No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202 (Mich. App. Jan. 19, 2012); Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 
N.W.2d 86 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).  
 126. Li Li, 39 A.3d at 796; Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at  *7; Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at *1. 
 127. No. 300660, 2012 WL 284580 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012). 
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In Vanderlaan, the plaintiff articulated concerns that his employer was 
not complying with federal law regarding billing practices in a medical 
clinic and he was terminated a short time later.
128
  The trial court granted 
summary judgment, apparently based on a lack of evidence of a causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s protected activity and his 
termination.
129
  On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court’s decision, stating that, “Plaintiff has presented no evidence, 
other than temporal proximity, connecting his protected activity to his 
termination.  A short time period between plaintiff engaging in protected 
activity and the termination of plaintiff’s employment, without more, is 




Vanderlaan is not alone in its employer-favorable standards on 
causation.  Even temporal proximity coupled with a strong motive to fire 
an employee who is making a protected report has been held to be 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish the causal link when the 
employer provided evidence of employee misbehavior on the job.
131
  
Along similar lines, temporal proximity coupled with evidence that the 
employee had received positive employment evaluations before making a 
report has been considered insufficient to establish that the employer’s 
stated reason for taking action is pretextual.
132
 
Close temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse 
employment action should be sufficient to establish causation for the 
purposes of establishing a prima facie case.  Furthermore, there is 
support for this proposition in whistleblowing cases brought under 
federal law.  For example, this standard of temporal proximity fulfilling 
the prima facie case has been accepted for whistleblowing claims 
                                                          
 128. Id. at *1. 
 129. Id. at *3. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
19, 2012) (accepting the employer’s articulated reason for firing the plaintiff in upholding summary 
judgment for the employer); Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief, King, 2012 WL 164202 (No. 
301246), 2011 WL 7627351 (arguing evidence of pretext through both temporal proximity and the 
employee’s report of wastewater overflow under a new policy that prohibited employees from 
reporting such overflows to the government to protect the company from heightened scrutiny and 
possible fines).  The appellate court accepted the causation argument, but ruled for the defendant 
because King failed to establish how his firing was pretextual.  King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5. 
 132. See, e.g., Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 N.W.2d 86, 92–93 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).  
In Teetor, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext 
despite complaining about allegedly improper conduct.  Id.  The court focused on formal grievance 
as the report of such conduct rather than the date on which the plaintiff initially protested the 
improper conduct.  Id. 
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brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
133
 
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case and introduces 
evidence that casts doubt on the employer’s explanation for its decision, 
whistleblower claims should be handled no less favorably than 
employment discrimination claims.
134
  In both instances, the prima facie 
case plus disproving evidence should be sufficient to allow the case to 
reach the jury. 
A recent decision involving wrongful discharge that was not a 
whistleblower claim illustrates this approach.  Shipp v. Mason General 
Hospital Foundation, out of the Washington Court of Appeals, was 
decided during the same time period as the cases in this study.
135
  It was 
not included in the pool of cases analyzed because the wrongful 
discharge claim was brought by an employee who was fired for filing a 
workers’ compensation claim—the plaintiff did not engage in 
whistleblowing.
136
  The court overruled summary judgment in favor of 
the employer and clarified the standard for granting summary judgment 
on a retaliatory discharge claim.
137
  Borrowing from retaliation claims 
brought under state anti-discrimination statutes, the court held that a 
plaintiff may rely on the same evidence used to establish her prima facie 
case to establish that the employer’s stated reason for taking adverse 
action is pretextual.
138
  The court went on to note that an employer 
                                                          
 133. See Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines, ARB No. 10-029, 2012 WL 1143309, at *7 (Dep’t of 
Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012) (“However, a temporal proximity of seven to eight months 
between protected activity and adverse action may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that 
the protected activity contributed to the adverse action.”).  See also Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, 437 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that “the ALJ permissibly treated the 
temporal proximity between the reports and the suspensions as sufficient to show the requisite causal 
relationship”). 
 134. Recent decisions under Sarbanes-Oxley take an even more employee-favorable approach, 
holding that after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the 
employer and remains there to establish that the employer would have taken the action regardless of 
the whistleblowing behavior.  See Zinn, 2012 WL 1143309, at *6. However, claims brought under 
Sarbanes-Oxley are subject to the burdens of proof established in the Wendell H. Ford Investment 
and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2012) (directing 
the use of 49 U.S.C. § 42121).  AIR 21 expressly provides that the employer must prove it would 
have taken the action regardless of the employee’s protected activity by clear and convincing 
evidence.  49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).  Most state whistleblower statutes do not have 
such a high standard for employers, making it questionable whether the Sarbanes-Oxley standard 
should be adopted.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.19-1 to -14 (West 2012) (containing no burden-
shifting scheme); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (2012).   
 135. No. 40647–1–II, 2012 WL 211654 (Wash. App. Jan. 24, 2012). 
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. Id. at *5–7. 
 138. Id. at *7 (citing Milligan v. Thompson, 42 P.3d 418, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
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Given the low win rates of plaintiffs in whistleblowing cases, it 
raises the question of whether the employee-favorable standard 
articulated by the Washington Court of Appeals would have been the 
same had the case involved whistleblowers instead of a worker’s 
compensation claimant. 
2. Viewing the Evidence in a Light Unfavorable to Employees 
As for the evidentiary issue, Vanderlaan is also an example of how 
courts tend to consider the evidence in a light that is unfavorable to 
employees.  In Vanderlaan, the court assessed the evidence—the 
plaintiff’s purported failure to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and 
drug test—and considered whether the evidence warranted the plaintiff’s 
termination.
140
  The court found that the plaintiff’s evidence was 
insufficient to establish causation.
141
  Facially, perhaps, this evidence is 
insufficient.  However, the court failed to mention any of the evidence 
that indicated that the defendant was requiring the plaintiff to submit to 
the exam and test in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.
142
  In 
other words, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, the retaliation began 
with the employer requiring the employee to undergo these activities.  
Given the divergent evidence, summary judgment appears to have been 
inappropriate. 
Another example of a court’s employer-favorable viewpoint is seen 
in Prieskorn v. University of Michigan Health System.
143
  In Prieskorn, 
the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for having complained of 
patient safety violations and time-card fraud.
144
  The trial court granted 
summary disposition to the employer, concluding that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a causal 
                                                          
 139. Id. (citing Renz v. Spokane Eye Clinic, P.S., 60 P.3d 106, 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 140. Vanderlaan v. Mich. Med., P.C., No. 300660, 2012 WL 284580, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
31, 2012). 
 141. Id.  
 142. See id. See also Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580 (No. 300660), 
2011 WL 762335, at *17–22 (discussing the psychiatric exam and facts indicating that the request 
was not justifiable).  The court also stated that the plaintiff “inexplicably” refused to submit to a 
psychiatric exam, which the defendant scheduled with a doctor of defendant’s choice and gave 
plaintiff only a 24-hour notice.  Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *3.  It is difficult to imagine any 
person agreeing to such a requirement.   
 143. No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012).   
 144. Id. at *1. 
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connection between the employee’s complaints and his termination.
145
  
On appeal, the employee asserted that the timing of his termination 
combined with the fact that he had received a good employee evaluation 
suggested that his termination was due to his whistleblowing 
complaints.
146
  The appellate court disagreed.
147
  It focused on the letter 
terminating the plaintiff, which articulated other reasons for his firing.
148
  
This, however, should not be sufficient to establish lack of causation as a 
matter of law; at best, it creates a second possible reason for the 
termination, and the determination of which is correct should be left to 
the fact-finder. 
This is not to suggest that summary judgment is never properly 
granted.  While it is impossible to determine as a matter of absolute 
certainty whether a decision is correct based on the records available, 
there are cases where summary judgment appears more appropriate than 
those described above.  For instance, in Morales v. Waste Management 
of Alameda County it was undisputed that the plaintiff made statements 
suggesting that he might engage in violent conduct—using a gun—in the 
workplace.
149
  The threat rose to the level of concern that the police were 
called and a report was filed.
150
  These statements violated the 




3. Narrowly Interpreting Statutes and Common Law Doctrines 
In addition to granting summary judgment on a frequent basis to 
defendants, there were a few instances of courts finding against plaintiffs 
by narrowly interpreting whistleblower protection statutes.  For example, 
in Prieskorn, the court effectively narrowed the scope of the protected 
conduct by determining that if the adverse employment action was based 
on a supervisor’s dislike of any complaining, rather than reacting to the 
substance of the complaints, then the complaints were not protected 
                                                          
 145. See id.  Summary disposition is a mechanism to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings 
and to obtain what amounts to summary judgment.  It differs from the federal motion to dismiss 
because the court can consider depositions and other evidence beyond the complaint.  Compare FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), with MICH. CT. R. 2.116(C)(10). 
 146. Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *3. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. No. A131130, 2012 WL 243231, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012).  
 150. Id. at *2. 
 151. Id. at *1–2. 
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activity.
152
  In that case, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony suggested 
that the firing was because the plaintiff’s supervisor was tired of hearing 
the plaintiff complain about a number of issues, some of which were 
protected and some of which were not.
153
  In other words, the court 
appeared to indicate that so long as the supervisor was upset about the 
complaining, not the substance of the complaints, it would not violate the 
whistleblower protection statute to fire the plaintiff. 
The flaw in this reasoning is as follows.  First, if the complaints were 
reports under the state’s whistleblower protection statute and were part of 
the reason for the termination, then regardless of the employer’s 
consideration of the substance of the complaint, the plaintiff was 
engaging in protected activity.
154
  This fits within the plain meaning of 
the statute.  Furthermore, following the Prieskorn approach would allow 
employers to circumvent the purpose of the statute by having a policy of 
firing all employees who complain.
155
 
The cases also suggest that courts are narrowly interpreting what 
constitutes a public policy sufficient to establish a common law claim for 
wrongful (or retaliatory) discharge in violation of public policy.  For 
example, in Ulm v. Memorial Medical Center, the court determined that 
no such claim is viable when the employee seeking relief is responsible 
for ensuring compliance with the statute that is the source of public 
policy.
156
  Thus, where an employee complains about a company’s non-
compliance with a statutory command, so long as compliance falls within 
that employee’s responsibilities, no wrongful discharge claim is 
                                                          
 152. 2012 WL 205801, at *3. 
 153. Id. at *3 n.2. 
 154. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (2013) (stating that, “[a]n employer shall not discharge, 
threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, 
terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on 
behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a 
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 155. Cf. Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380–81 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(stating that, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where an employee made numerous complaints, some 
of which were protected and some of which were not, summary judgment was inappropriate because 
allowing an employer to rely upon the unprotected complaints would undermine the goals of the 
whistleblower protection provision). 
 156. 964 N.E.2d 632, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  For another similar example, see also Ainsworth 
v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222, at *3 (Nev. Mar. 20, 2012) (holding that 
reports of illegal activity to a supervisor is not protected whistleblowing activity).  On the other 
hand, one case in the sample came out against the job duties exclusion and noted that “the entire 
purpose of the [public policy] exception [to at-will employment] would be thwarted” if the exclusion 
were adopted.  Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Coop., 272 P.3d 1263, 1272 (Idaho 2012). 
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allowed.
157
  The court articulated its rationale as follows: 
Whether plaintiff was adequately performing her job with respect to 
defendant’s compliance with laws . . . is more a dispute for the parties 
to resolve privately than a public matter justifying the courts’ 
involvement on behalf of the citizenry . . . even though the integrity of 
essential health information may have been at stake.
158
 
The court’s decision suffers from two failings.  First, its articulation 
of the issue—focusing on the plaintiff’s job performance instead of 
whether the employee complained about non-compliance—is 
misleading.  The issue of whether an employee was performing his or her 
job is separate from the inquiry into whether the employee was faced 
with the prospect of either personally violating the law or, through her 
job, having a company violate the law.  If the employee is truly not 
performing her job properly, that inquiry would become a part of the 
court’s analysis of whether the employer had a legitimate reason for 
taking adverse action against the employee.  It should not be a part of the 
court’s analysis of whether a plaintiff has identified an appropriate 
source of public policy.
159
  Second, if the integrity of essential health 
information is at stake, it is not merely a “private dispute” between the 
employer and the employee.  Those whose health information is at risk 
are also interested parties, which brings the matter out of the purely 
private realm and into the public interest realm. 
Another example of narrow interpretation of whistleblower 
protection is seen in one of the decisions in the sample that addressed the 
intent requirement for an employee engaging in protected behavior.  In 
Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., the Nevada Supreme Court held 
that in order to be protected, an employee “must affirmatively decide to 
expose illegal or unsafe practices.”
160
  Employees, like the plaintiffs in 
Ainsworth, who report employer conduct without knowing it is illegal 




In Ainsworth, one of the plaintiffs was speaking with the Nevada 
                                                          
 157. See Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 639.  Essentially, this imports the job duties exclusion I analyzed in 
The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 137 (2011) into common law claims for wrongful discharge.   
 158. Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 639. 
 159. For a detailed explanation of the flaws with the job duties exclusion, see Modesitt, supra 
note 157. 
 160. No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222, at *2 (Nev. March 20, 2012). 
 161. Id.  
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Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP) about a construction 
project.
162
  The NDEP asked the plaintiff when plans would be submitted 
for a “quench tank” that was required under the state’s environmental 
protection laws.
163
  Plans for this quench tank were required to be filed 
with the NDEP before construction began.
164
  The plaintiff informed the 
NDEP that construction on the quench tank had already begun, not 
realizing at the time that the plans had to be filed before construction was 
underway.
165
  The plaintiff disclosed illegal activity but was not aware 
that the conduct was illegal, and she was allegedly fired for doing so.
166
  
Where an employee exposes actual illegal conduct, not suspected illegal 
conduct, even unwittingly, it is a sufficiently important public interest 
that it should be protected.  Indeed, it seems arguably more crucial to 
protect these disclosures than situations where an employee reasonably 
believes that the conduct is illegal but is mistaken—and these situations 
are frequently protected by courts.
167
  If the employee is wrong, but has a 
reasonable belief, there is no illegal conduct that needs to be exposed or 
remedied.  However, if the employee is right, even if the employee did 
not intend to blow the whistle, there is still a direct social benefit to the 
disclosure of wrongdoing. 
D. Are Courts Hostile to Whistleblowers? 
One of the most disturbing findings of this research is the indication 
that whistleblowers in state court cases appear to be prevailing at a rate 
that is only somewhat higher than the rate of SOX whistleblowers.  It 
was entirely unexpected, in part because Moberly’s analysis of the 
reasons for the low win rates in SOX cases focused primarily on factors 
unique to Sarbanes-Oxley: narrow interpretations of the applicable 
statutes of limitations, narrow interpretations of the employers covered 
by the Act, narrow interpretations of the Act’s protections, and 
misapplications of the employee-friendly burden of proof.
168
  Before 
                                                          
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. See id. 
 165. See id.  
 166. Id. 
 167. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, apps. A, B (listing multiple state statutes where a 
reasonable belief is protected).   
 168. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 107–31 (discussing the narrow 
interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal parameters and the legal rationales used when deciding in 
favor of the employer).  
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conducting the research, it was expected that, when not before a tribunal 
hampered in the manner Moberly articulates, whistleblowers would 
prevail at significantly higher rates than SOX whistleblowers. 
Indeed, it was also anticipated that whistleblowers would prevail at 
rates higher than employment discrimination plaintiffs.  Whistleblowers, 
it seemed, would be seen in a more positive light than employment 
discrimination plaintiffs because of the well-publicized failures of 
corporations to effectively police themselves
169
 and the media’s positive 
portrayal of whistleblowers.  Yet the similarity in outcomes seen in SOX 
cases and this research suggest there is some commonality in how 
decision-making parties view whistleblowers—and that the view is not 
positive. 
A common theme that might account for courts’ apparent hostility to 
employees in whistleblower cases is that courts dislike having to delve 
into the minutia of the reasons for an employee’s termination.  Corporate 
lawyers have used this by focusing attention on the business judgment 
rule, suggesting that so long as the corporation articulates a facially 
legitimate reason for taking adverse action against the plaintiff, courts 
should respect and not second guess the corporate judgment.
170
  As 
articulated in an appellate brief filed by management, “Courts do not sit 
as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the 
business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those 
judgments involve intentional discrimination.”
171
  Directly addressing the 
issue of pretext, one management attorney put it baldly, stating, “Plaintiff 
may not simply question, or second guess, the soundness of [the 
employer’s] business judgment to show pretext. . . .  ‘[A] fact-finder 
need not, and indeed should not, evaluate whether a defendant’s stated 
purpose is unwise or unreasonable.’”
172
  These quotes and this doctrine 
                                                          
 169. See, e.g., Phil Angelides, Chairman, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s Autopsy of 
Our Failed Financial System, Address at the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 
Symposium: FCIC and the Crisis: Preventing the Next Financial Meltdown (Nov. 10, 2011), in 80 
UMKC L. REV. 949, 954–57 (2012) (explaining financial regulation failures were caused by an 
incorrect belief that the financial industry could manage risks without a high level of public 
oversight); L. Randall Wray, Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Bail-Out, Future Draft, 80 UMKC L. 
REV. 1101, 1102 (2012) (discussing the failures of corporate governance caused by the move toward 
self-regulation). 
 170. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees Dawson Pub. Power Dist. and Robert A. Heinz, Teetor v. 
Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) (No. A-11-00170), 2011 WL 
2617947, at *3–5 (articulating laws regarding employers’ rights to terminate at-will employees for 
good cause). 
 171. Id. at *4 (citing Elam v. Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 881–82 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 172. Defendant-Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 
 
  
194 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
are misleading in the context of whistleblower claims where the plaintiff 
alleges pretext.  The entire point of the plaintiff’s argument is that the 
stated reason for the adverse employment action is not valid; the court or 
jury must assess the corporation’s stated reasons and look behind the 
articulated rationale.  Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
there is sufficient evidence to justify disregarding the business judgment 
rule—it should have no application in this context. 
However, this dislike of playing the role of a super-human resources 
department should, at worst, put whistleblowers in a position akin to 
employment discrimination plaintiffs.  It fails to account for the lower 
success rates of whistleblowing plaintiffs.  Is it merely because 
whistleblowers are still seen as snitches, despite the recently positive 
media portrayals?  Is it because whistleblowing plaintiffs have personal 
characteristics that make them less likeable to judges?  These questions 
are important because even if the legal standards are brought into 
alignment with causation in other contexts, if judges are predisposed 
against whistleblowers, a purely legal correction may not solve the 
problem. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When I undertook this research, I understood from practitioners that 
there was a sense that plaintiffs in whistleblowing cases do not fare 
particularly well.  My findings are a testament to that notion.  Plaintiffs 
in state court whistleblowing cases prevail at a rate well below that of 
torts plaintiffs and more akin to the whistleblower plaintiffs studied by 
Moberly under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at the administrative level.  The 
biggest single reason for the failure of plaintiffs appears to lie within the 
causation element of the claim.  This research suggests that courts are 
denying claims based on employer-favorable legal standards as well as 
by considering the evidence in a light favorable to the employer.  
However, this is an initial review of a set of cases raising the issue of 
whether state courts are improperly denying relief to plaintiffs.  It is not a 
definitive study.  Review and analysis of the current causation legal 
standards that state courts across the country apply is necessary to 
determine whether this is a broad problem or one limited to the 
jurisdictions represented in the study. 
                                                          
164202 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012) (No. 301246), 2011 WL 7627350, at *25 (quoting DeMarco 
v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Dubey v. Stroh Brewery Co., 
462 N.W.2d 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990))).  
